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NOTES
The Cause of Action for Damages Under North Carolina's
Constitution: Corum v. University of North Carolina
The North Carolina Constitution's Declaration of Rights1 offers in-
dividuals shelter from state encroachment on certain fundamental civil
liberties. Although many may have ignored the protection the state con-
stitution affords its citizens, the North Carolina Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Corum v. University of North Carolina2 should usher in a
resurgent attitude. Corum breathed new life into the Declaration of
Rights by holding that an individual whose free speech rights a state
official has violated may seek damages directly under the North Carolina
Constitution3 and by abolishing sovereign immunity as a potential bar to
this constitutional cause of action.4 The supreme court acted in response
to an earlier challenge from Chief Justice Exum, who called on the state's
lawyers to "dust off the old document" in state courts and use its protec-
tive provisions to preserve individual rights.5 The court's decision in
Corum represents a vigorous shake indeed, and when the dust settles,
North Carolina may well emerge into a new era marked by the practical
primacy of state constitutional jurisprudence.
This Note analyzes the Corum court's state constitutional holdings,6
discusses the limited precedential support in North Carolina for the deci-
sion,7 and examines the federal impetus for this cause of action.' The
Note suggests that although Corurn may be viewed in isolation and lim-
ited to its facts,9 sufficient support exists for extending the Corum princi-
ple to other provisions in the Declaration of Rights. 10 The Note
concludes that North Carolina attorneys should test the waters and force
1. Article I of the state constitution, referred to as the Declaration of Rights, is com-
prised of many provisions that enumerate individual and collective rights of the people of
North Carolina, some of which duplicate those in the federal Constitution. See N.C. CONST.
art. I; for a comparison of the Declaration of Rights and the Federal Bill of Rights, see infra
note 93 and accompanying text.
2. 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992).
3. Id. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 292; see N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 14 (freedom of speech).
4. Corum, 330 N.C. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 291-92.
5. James G. Exum, Jr., Dusting Off Our State Constitution, N.C. ST. B.Q., Spring 1986,
at 6, 8.
6. See infra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
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the courts to reexamine the fundamental importance of the state consti-
tution in protecting individual fights.
Dr. Alvis Corm was a tenured faculty member and the Dean of
Learning Resources at Appalachian State University.11 Corum's duties
included supervising the Appalachian Collection,12 which was housed in
the University's Daughtery Library. 3 In 1983, school administrators be-
gan to discuss the possibility of moving the collection to different facili-
ties. 4 Dr. Harvey Durham, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and
Corum's immediate supervisor, informed Corum of his decision to move
the collection' 5 but failed to mention that the component parts would be
placed in separate locations.1 6
At a subsequent meeting with various school administrators con-
cerning the details of moving the collection, Corum learned that the col-
lection indeed would be bifurcated. 7 The next day, Corum presented an
alternative plan that would keep the collection intact.' The day after
Corm's alternative proposal, Durham discharged Corum from his
deanship.19
Corum, believing that Durham demoted him in retaliation for exer-
cising his right to freedom of speech, filed a grievance proceeding with
the University of North Carolina.20 After a ruling in Durham's favor,
11. Corum, 330 N.C. at 767, 413 S.E.2d at 280.
12. The Appalachian Collection consisted of a collection of books, research reports, mu-
sic, and artifacts, all of which "represent[ed] the mountain culture of the Southern Appalach-
ian Region." Id. at 767, 413 S.E.2d at 281.
13. Id. at 767, 413 S.E.2d at 280-81.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 768, 413 S.E.2d at 281. Corum accepted Durham's decision under the belief
that the proposal "would at least maintain the physical integrity of the Collection." Id.
16. Id. Corum's primary concern throughout the discussion concerning moving the Col-
lection was that it not be divided by location. Id.
17. Id. Although Durham was not present, Dr. Clinton Parker, the Associate Vice Chan-
cellor of Academic Affairs, attended this meeting as Durham's representative. Id.
18. Id. at 769, 413 S.E.2d at 281. Parker, in Durham's absence, acknowledged that he
lacked authority to change Durham's decision but volunteered to inform him of Corum's pro-
posals. Id.
. 19. Id. at 769, 413 S.E.2d at 282. Durham believed that Corum's actions amounted to a
refusal to implement the decision to move the Collection, while Corum maintained that he
fully cooperated despite his expression of concerns with Durham's decision. Id. Dr. John
Thomas, the Chancellor of Appalachian State University, affirmed the demotion of Dr.
Corum, although neither Durham nor Thomas gave Corum an opportunity to explain his
remarks. Id. Corum was allowed to remain a tenured faculty member. Id.
20. Id. Corum claimed Durham concealed the fact that the Collection would be divided
until the "eleventh hour," Comrn v. University of North Carolina, 97 N.C. App. 527, 536, 389
S.E.2d 596, 601 (1990), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992), in
order to make the moving of the Collection "administratively easier by preventing vocal oppo-
sition to the decision." Corum, 330 N.C. at 769-70, 413 S.E.2d at 282. When Corum exposed
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Corum filed an action against the University of North Carolina and sev-
eral university officials21 seeking injunctive relief and damages pursuant
to the federal civil rights statute22 and the North Carolina Constitution.23
Believing that the doctrines of sovereign and qualified immunity barred
such actions,24 the defendants moved for summary judgment, but the
trial court denied their motions.25
After analyzing the federal civil rights claims, 26 the North Carolina
this "ruse" by presenting his alternative proposal, Durham retaliated by demoting him. Id. at
770,413 S.E.2d at 282. Durham defended his actions as a permissible response to insubordina-
tion. Id.
21. The named defendants were the University of North Carolina (UNC), of which Appa-
lachian State University is a part, Appalachian State University (ASU), Mr. Spangler (Presi-
dent of UNC) in his official capacity, and Drs. Thomas and Durham in their official and
individual capacities. Corum, 97 N.C. App. at 532, 389 S.E.2d at 599.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides remedies to persons deprived of a
federal right by a state official. These remedies include damages, injunctive relief, declaratory
relief, and attorney fees. Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims,
63 TEX. L. Rav. 1269, 1273-74 (1985). Obstacles of sovereign immunity and qualified immu-
nity, however, often make these remedies difficult to achieve. See id. at 1274.
23. Corum, 330 N.C. at 766, 413 S.E.2d at 280.
24. Id. The doctrine of sovereign immunity apparently arose from the English concept
that "the King can do no wrong." Id. at 785, 413 S.E.2d at 291. See Russell v. Men of Devon,
2 T.R. 667, 672-73, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362-63 (1788); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 970 (4th ed. 1971); Louis E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and
the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Viola-
tions, 69 CAL. L. REv. 189, 196 n.24 (1981); infra note 55 and accompanying text. This doc-
trine bars relief "on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank,
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.). Because sovereign immunity is a bar to jurisdiction
itself, courts grant interlocutory appeal. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
§ 8.6.1, at 405-06 (1989); cf Corum, 330 N.C. at 767, 413 S.E.2d at 280 (treating sovereign
immunity as a defense instead of a bar to jurisdiction and still granting interlocutory appeal).
As Professor Prosser explained, the immunity is based on the defendant's favored status, not
the merits of the case. PROSSER, supra, § 131, at 970-71. The doctrine of qualified immunity
similarly bars relief if the official acted in his capacity and in "good faith." Perry M. Rosen,
The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. REv. 337, 348-49 (1989).
Judge Learned Hand explained that it is "better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by
dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950).
25. Corum, 330 N.C. at 766, 413 S.E.2d at 280.
26. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in denying defendants' motion for
summary judgment on plaintiff's § 1983 claims as to UNC and ASU and the individual de-
fendants acting in their official capacities, reasoning that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
barred an action against them for damages under § 1983. Corum v. University of North Caro-
lina, 97 N.C. App. 527, 533, 389 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1990), affl'd in part and rev'd in part, 330
N.C. 761,413 S.E.2d 276 (1992). The court of appeals relied on an earlier decision which held
that an action brought under § 1983 against UNC and Winston-Salem State University was
barred because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, id. at 532-33, 389 S.E.2d at 599 (citing
Truesdale v. University of North Carolina, 91 N.C. App. 186, 371 S.E.2d 503 (1988), disc. rev.
denied, 323 N.C. 706, 377 S.E.2d 229, cert denied, 493 U.S. 808 (1989)), and reasoned that
1902 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
Court of Appeals considered Corum's claims arising under the North
Carolina Constitution. The court of appeals held that sovereign immu-
nity barred any action under the state constitution against the state and
against the individual defendants in their official capacities.2 7 As to Drs.
Thomas and Durham in their individual capacities, however, the court
affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment, maintaining that a
governmental employee may be held personally liable under the North
Carolina Constitution only if he acts outside the scope of his duties.28
The North Carolina Supreme Court29 granted discretionary review
and affirmed in part and reversed in part the appellate court's decision. 30
"an action against a State employee in his official capacity for monetary damages would actu-
ally be an award against the State since the award would be paid from the State treasury." Id.
at 533, 389 S.E.2d at 599. The court did hold, however, that sovereign immunity does not bar
a claim for prospective injunctive relief under § 1983 against defendants acting in their official
capacities. Id. As to Thomas and Durham in their individual capacities, the court held that
the trial court should have granted summary judgment under the doctrine of qualified immu-
nity. Id. at 536, 389 S.E.2d at 601. The court noted that government officials sued in their
individual capacities under § 1983 for damages may raise the defense of qualified immunity,
which will shield them "'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."' Id. at 534, 389 S.E.2d at 600 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). Harlow established this objective standard-whether a government official
violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known"-to determine when a defense of qualified immunity bars further litiga-
tion. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. The court then discussed the essential elements of a § 1983
action for a freedom of speech violation: whether the speech addresses a matter of public
concern, and if so, whether the employee's interest in speaking out on the issue outweighs the
government's interest in effectively and efficiently fulfilling its responsibilities to the public.
Corum, 97 N.C. App. at 535, 389 S.E.2d at 600 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147,
150 (1983)). The court conceded that Corum's speech addressed a matter of public concern,
Corum, 97 N.C. App. at 535, 389 S.E.2d at 600-01, but based on a balancing of the employee's
and government's interests, concluded that "[i]t is apparent to us that when defendants acted
they were not violating a 'clearly established' right of which a reasonable person would have
known." Id. at 536, 389 S.E.2d at 601.
27. Corum, 97 N.C. App. at 537, 389 S.E.2d at 601. As a result, the court barred Dr.
Corum from seeking relief for violations of the North Carolina Constitution against UNC and
ASU, and against Spangler, Thomas, and Durham in their official capacities. Id.
28. Id. at 538, 389 S.E.2d at 602 ("In the instant case, plaintiff has alleged and come
forward with some evidence that the two defendants acted in violation of law, and therefore
outside the scope of their duties in discharging plaintiff.").
29. Justice Harry Martin's majority opinion in Corum was his valedictory before retiring.
Corum, 330 N.C. at 766, 413 S.E.2d at 277, 280. Justice Webb was the lone dissenter. Id. at
790, 413 S.E.2d at 294 (Webb, J., dissenting). For Justice Martin's views on the role of the
state constitution as a source of individual liberty, see Harry C. Martin, The State as a "Font of
Individual Liberties'" North Carolina Accepts the Challenge, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1749, 1752-56
(1992).
30. Corum, 330 N.C. at 766, 413 S.E.2d at 280. With regard to the federal civil rights
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the supreme court held that a state and its employees who are
acting in their official capacities are not considered "persons" for purposes of a monetary claim
under § 1983, although they are considered "persons" when the remedy sought under § 1983
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Because Corum claimed that Durham had violated his right to free
speech under the North Carolina Constitution31 by demoting him for his
vocal opposition to moving the Appalachian Collection, 2 and because no
North Carolina statute provides a cause of action for this constitutional
violation, the supreme court had to decide if a cause of action exists
under the state constitution.33 The court held that Corum "does have a
direct cause of action under the State Constitution for alleged violations
of his freedom of speech rights." 34 First, the court explained that the free
speech provision is self-executing; it is not dependent upon a legislative
is injunctive relief. Id. at 771, 413 S.E.2d at 282-83. The court found that Corum had not
presented sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment as to ASU, UNC,
Spangler, and Thomas for injunctive relief, id. at 781, 413 S.E.2d at 289, but had presented
enough evidence to continue his claim for injunctive relief against Durham in his official capac-
ity. Id. at 780-81, 413 S.E.2d at 288-89. The court held that neither sovereign nor qualified
immunity is available as a defense when one is sued in one's official capacity under § 1983, id.
at 771-72, 413 S.E.2d at 283, and overruled Truesdale v. University of North Carolina, 91
N.C. App. 186, 371 S.E.2d 503 (1988), disc rev. denied, 323 N.C. 706, 377 S.E.2d 229 (1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 808 (1989), insofar as it stands for the proposition that sovereign immu-
nity bars § 1983 actions against state institutions. Corum, 330 N.C. at 771 n.2, 413 S.E.2d at
283 n.2.
When a monetary claim is asserted against a state official in his individual capacity, how-
ever, the court held that he may be personally liable to the extent that the defense of qualified
immunity does not lie. Id. at 772, 413 S.E.2d at 283-84. The supreme court reasoned that:
unlike a suit against a state official in his official capacity, which is basically a suit
against the official office and therefore against the State itself, a suit against an indi-
vidual who happens to be a governmental official but is not acting in his official
capacity is not imputed to the State. Presumably, they are personally liable for pay-
ment of any damages awarded.
Id. at 772, 413 S.E.2d at 283. The North Carolina Supreme Court altered the objective
Harlow test, see supra note 26, maintaining that "where the existence of a constitutional viola-
tion depends on proof of motivation," a court must also inquire into the defendant's motive,
his state of mind. Corum, 330 N.C. at 773, 413 S.E.2d at 284. Applying this subjective analy-
sis, the court concluded that Corum had presented sufficient evidence of improper motive to
withstand Durham's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 781, 413 S.E.2d at 289. The court
held, however, that Thomas should prevail on his motion. Id.
31. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 ("Freedom of speech and of the press are two of the great
bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but every person shall be held
responsible for their abuse.").
32. Corum, 330 N.C. at 769, 413 S.E.2d at 282.
33. Id. at 781, 413 S.E.2d at 289.
34. Id. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 292. The court chose to limit this holding to defendants who
are state officials acting in their official capacities. Id. at 787-88, 413 S.E.2d at 292-93. Rea-
soning that the framers intended that the Declaration of Rights protect individuals against
state action, the court stated:
In 1776 when the people of North Carolina established the State of North Carolina,
they clearly and affirmatively set forth certain fundamental human rights which their
government was bound to respect. Through the Declaration of Rights, the people of
North Carolina secured these rights against state officials and shifting political ma-
jorities.... The Declaration of Rights was intended to protect individual rights from
1903
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enactment for its enforcement or impairment.35 The supreme court then
proclaimed that "the common law, which provides a remedy for every
wrong, will furnish the appropriate action for the adequate redress of a
violation of that right."' 36 As partial explanation and illustration of the
type of action it was recognizing, the court referred to an earlier decision
where, without a statutory provision, it ordered a similar remedy of com-
pensation to an individual whose property had been taken by the State.37
The court, describing free speech as "one of the fundamental corner-
stones of individual liberty and one of the great ordinances of our Consti-
tution," asserted that it was deserving of at least as much protection as
the right to possess and use property.38 The court, therefore, concluded
that a direct action against the State under the state constitution is neces-
sary to protect an individual's right to free speech, and that, in the ab-
sence of other remedies, the common law guarantees such an action.39
infringement by the State. To that end, the Declaration of Rights expresses the
rights it guarantees in clear and explicit language.
As a matter of fundamental jurisprudence the Constitution itself does not recog-
nize or create rights which may be asserted against individuals.
Id. at 787, 413 S.E.2d at 292-93. As a result, Corum had no state constitutional claim against
Durham or Thomas in their individual capacities. Id. at 789, 413 S.E.2d at 293. The court,
moreover, allowed Corum's state constitutional claim to proceed only against Durham acting
in his official capacity, maintaining that Corum failed to present sufficient evidence to with-
stand a motion for summary judgment from the other defendants. Id.
35. Id. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289.
36. Id. On the one hand, the court's statement implies that the cause of action represents
a common-law response to the need for a remedy rather than a constitutional response. If the
remedy is common-law only and not constitutionally compelled, the General Assembly can
statutorily abridge or abolish the cause of action without replacing it. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 24, § 9.1.2, at 457-58. On the other hand, the court notes that the source of this cause of
action comes from the judiciary's "inherent constitutional power." Corum, 330 N.C. at 784,
413 S.E.2d at 291.
37. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782-85, 413 S.E.2d at 289-90 (discussing Sale v. State Highway &
Pub. Works Comm'n, 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955)). Sale involved a provision in the
Declaration of Rights (N.C. CONsT. art I, § 19 (formerly § 17)) which implicitly guarantees
compensation for government takings of private property. Sale, 242 N.C. at 617, 89 S.E.2d at
295; see infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. The court's comparison of the two cases in
the context of a common-law remedy involving self-executing provisions is significantly similar
to a natural law analysis. Also illustrative of the court's natural law approach is its statement
that the judiciary's "obligation to protect the fundamental rights of individuals is as old as the
State." Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290.
38. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289; cf. Harry C. Martin, Freedom of Speech in
North Carolina Prior to Gitlow v. New York, With a Forward Glance Thereafter, 4 CAMPBELL
L. REv. 243, 248 (1982) ("Freedom of speech is a fundamental doctrine and is indispensable to
the continued growth and well-being of our free society.").
39. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782-83, 413 S.E.2d at 289; see also Corum v. University of North
Carolina, 97 N.C. App. 527, 540, 389 S.E.2d 596, 603 (1990) (Greene, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (maintaining that "[t]o deny such a claim would deny the plaintiff the
Ivery essence of civil liberty' which entitles 'every individual to claim the protection of the
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Finding this cause of action under the constitution, the court turned
to the issue of sovereign immunity as a bar to the action's success. Not-
ing the long history of sovereign immunity,' the court conceded its va-
lidity as a show of respect for the legislature as a co-equal governmental
branch.41 The court, nonetheless, held that sovereign immunity will not
bar an action against the State for a constitutional violation,42 and de-
clared that:
It would indeed be a fanciful gesture to say on the one hand
that citizens have constitutional individual civil rights that are
protected from encroachment actions by the state, while on the
other hand saying that individuals whose constitutional rights
have been violated by the State cannot sue because of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. 3
The court reasoned that whenever enforcement or protection of a consti-
tutional right clashes with the judicially created doctrine of sovereign
immunity, it is the common-law immunity that must succumb.
4 4
The supreme court remanded the case to determine the necessary
relief for the violation of Corum's free speech rights, subject to two limi-
tations.4  First, before a court can exercise its "inherent constitutional
power" to create a common-law remedy for a violation of a constitu-
tional right, it must submit to any existing alternative statutory or proce-
laws, whenever he receives an injury' ") (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
163 (1803)), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992).
40. Corum, 330 N.C. at 785, 413 S.E.2d at 291; see supra note 24; infra notes 55-61 and
accompanying text.
41. Corum, 330 N.C. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 291. Thus, "courts have deferred to the legis-
lature the determination of those instances in which the sovereign waives its traditional immu-
nity." Id.
42. Id. at 785-86, 413 S.E.2d at 291. "The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot stand
as a barrier to North Carolina citizens who seek to remedy violations of their rights guaranteed
by the Declaration of Rights." Id.
43. Id. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 291.
44. Id. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 292. Abolishing the doctrine of sovereign immunity as to
constitutional claims against the State and state officials in their official capacities, the court
found that Corum had presented sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for summary judg-
ment by Durham. Id. at 789, 413 S.E.2d at 293. The court granted the motions for summary
judgment, however, brought by UNC, ASU, Spangler, and Thomas. Id.
45. Id. at 784-85, 413 S.E.2d at 291. The court, without specifying the scope of relief
available under Corum's state constitutional law claim, mentioned that relief could consist of
reinstatement of Corum's deanship and lost wages. Id. at 784, 413 S.E.2d at 291. The court
noted, however, that "[v]arious rights that are protected by our Declaration of Rights may
require greater or lesser relief to rectify the violation of such rights, depending upon the right
violated and the facts of the particular case." Id. In conclusion, the court suggested that the
state constitutional claim completed Corum's relief options by providing recovery of monetary
damages against Durham in his official capacity. Id. at 789, 413 S.E.2d at 294.
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dural remedies." Second, the court must respect the other branches of
government and apply "the least intrusive remedy available and neces-
sary to right the wrong."'47
Sale v. State Highway & Public Works Commission48 was the pre-
cursor to the Corum private cause of action under the state constitution.
In Sale, the State Highway Commission acquired an easement over the
plaintiff's property in return for compensation and the removal and re-
construction elsewhere of the buildings located on the easement.49 Dur-
ing removal, the buildings were destroyed by fire, and the plaintiff
brought an action to recover the compensation due him plus damages
arising from the destruction."0 The plaintiff argued that unless he was
compensated, he would be deprived of his property in violation of article
I, section 1711 of the state constitution.52 The North Carolina Supreme
Court characterized this constitutional provision as self-executing5 3 and
declared:
When Article I, Section 17, of the North Carolina Consti-
tution provides that "no person [shall be] ... in any manner
deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the
land," and when the fundamental law of this State, based on
natural justice and equity, prohibits the taking or acquisition of
private property for public use without the payment of just
compensation, or its equivalent, and the North Carolina Con-
stitution points out no remedy, and if no statute affords an ade-
quate remedy.., the common law which provides a remedy for
every wrong will furnish the appropriate action for the ade-
quate redress of such grievance.54
46. Id. at 784, 413 S.E.2d at 291 (citing In re Alamance Cty. Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84,
99-105, 405 S.E.2d 125, 132-35 (1991)).
47. Id. These limitations are similar to those specified in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971). See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
48. 242 N.C. 613, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955); see also Midgett v. North Carolina State Highway
Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 250, 132 S.E.2d 599, 608 (1963) (applying Sale), overruled in part by
Lea Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Transp., 308 N.C. 603, 304 S.E.2d 164 (1983).
49. Sale, 242 N.C. at 616, 89 S.E.2d at 294.
50. Id. at 615, 89 S.E.2d at 294.
51. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17. The current version of this provision is found in N.C.
CON ST. art. I, § 19.
52. Sale, 242 N.C. at 617, 89 S.E.2d at 295.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 618, 89 S.E.2d at 296. The court viewed this principle of compensation as
"grounded in natural law." Id. at 617, 89 S.E.2d at 295. Similar cases regarding the taking of
private property have provided remedies with a view toward natural justice. See, e.g., John-
ston v. Rankin, 70 N.C. 550, 555 (1874) (maintaining that even absent a constitutional provi-
sion of compensation for the taking of private property, compensating the individual "is so
grounded in natural equity that it has never been denied to be a part of the law of North
Carolina"); University of North Carolina v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58, 88 (1805) (allowing an injunction
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By contrast, North Carolina has a long, albeit eroding, history of
support for the doctrine of sovereign immunity. North Carolina appar-
ently adopted the doctrine in 1889 in Moffitt v. City ofAsheville.55 Justice
Avery, writing for the court, explained:
[W]here a city or town in [sic] exercising the judicial, discre-
tionary or legislative authority, conferred by its charter, or is
discharging a duty, imposed solely for the benefit of the public,
it incurs no liability for the negligence of its officers, though
acting under color of office, unless some statute (expressly or by
necessary implication) subjects the corporation to pecuniary re-
sponsibility for such negligence.-
6
Thereafter, North Carolina courts consistently applied the doctrine, and
the General Assembly recognized it as the public policy of the state."
More recently, however, the supreme court has criticized the logic of
sovereign immunity and called for the legislature to modify or repeal the
doctrine. 8 The court pointed to the inconsistency between this country's
traditional concepts of democratic government and of an individual's
right to redress for injuries and the anachronistic notion that a state can
escape liability solely because of its status. 9 Illustrative of the court's
disenchantment with the doctrine was its creation in 1976 of an excep-
tion to sovereign immunity whenever the State enters into a contract.6
The court reasoned that when the State assumes a contractual obligation,
it "implicitly consents to be sued for damages on the contract in the
event it breaches the contract," and that any other result would discredit
against a legislative enactment that would have taken away property from the trustees of
UNC).
55. 103 N.C. 237, 255, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889). North Carolina did not adopt the doctrine
of sovereign immunity when it statutorily adopted the common law of England because the
decision incorporating the doctrine into English common law postdated by thirteen years
North Carolina's statutory adoption, but instead espoused it as a creature of the judiciary in
respect for its co-equal branch, the General Assembly. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279
N.C. 589, 592, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1971); Corum, 330 N.C. at 785, 413 S.E.2d at 291.
56. Moffltt, 103 N.C. at 255, 9 S.E. at 697.
57. Corum, 330 N.C. at 785, 413 S.E.2d at 291. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485
(1987) (waiver of immunity by municipality through purchase of insurance); id. § 153A-435
(1991) (same for counties); id. § 115D-24 (1990) (same for Boards of Trustees of state commu-
nity colleges).
58. Steelman, 279 N.C. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243. Although judicially created, the Gen-
eral Assembly recognized sovereign immunity as part of the state's public policy; therefore, the
court in Steelman maintained that any modification or repeal of the doctrine should come
from the legislature. Id. at 594-95, 184 S.E.2d at 242-43.
59. Id. at 593-94, 184 S.E.2d at 242-43 (citing Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.
2d 130, 132-33 (Fla. 1957)). The court noted that several other jurisdictions had modified or
overruled the doctrine, particularly in the area of tort liability. Id.
60. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 320, 222 S.E.2d 412, 423-24 (1976).
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the integrity and reputation of the State.6"
The landmark decision from the United States Supreme Court
which provides impetus and guidance to states willing to recognize a pri-
vate constitutional cause of action62 is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
61. Id. The court drew a distinction between contract liability and tort liability, and
noted that any repeal of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in tort actions should come from
the General Assembly. Id. at 322, 222 S.E.2d at 424-25. The court's justification for the
distinction between the causes of action is that the State can estimate its liability for breach of
contract, but "the extent of tort liability for wrongful death and personal injuries is never
predictable." Id. at 322, 222 S.E.2d at 425. Without liability limitations, moreover, jury ver-
dicts could unduly strain the State's budget. Id.
In dissent, Justice Lake maintained that sovereign immunity is not judicially created but
is an inherent attribute of sovereign rule, and thus the judiciary is not the proper branch of
government to modify or repeal the doctrine. Id. at 341, 222 S.E.2d at 436-37 (Lake, J., dis-
senting). Justice Lake prophesied that "[t]he road to judicial dictatorship is also paved with
good intentions." Id. at 338, 222 S.E.2d at 434 (Lake, J., dissenting).
62. Several states besides North Carolina have allowed a private cause of action under
their state constitutions. See, e.g., Fenton v. Groveland Community Servs. Dist., 135 Cal.
App. 3d 797, 804-05, 185 Cal. Rptr. 758, 762-64 (1982) (allowing an action for damages under
the California Constitution where there is a violation of one's right to work); Schreiner v.
McKenzie Tank Lines, 408 So. 2d 711, 713-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (determining that the
provision in the Florida Constitution which prohibits any deprivation of a right because of
"race, religion or physical handicap" is self-executing), approved, 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983);
Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 60 Ill. App. 3d 616, 620, 377 N.E.2d 242, 244-45 (1978)
(acknowledging action for compensatory and punitive damages for sex discrimination under
the Illinois Constitution); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 537-38, 479
A.2d 921, 930 (1984) (allowing a common-law action for damages under the Maryland Consti-
tution where there has been deprivation of property or an illegal search or seizure); Phillips v.
Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 390 Mass. 652, 658-60, 459 N.E.2d 453, 457-78 (1983) (demon-
strating willingness to grant judicial remedy for a due process violation under the Massachu-
setts Constitution if state action is proven); Smith v. Department of Pub. Health, 428 Mich.
540, 541-42, 410 N.W.2d 749, 751 (1987) (stating willingness to consider claims for damages
for certain violations of the Michigan Constitution, although declining to do so on the facts
presented), afd sub nom. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Peper v.
Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 79-80, 389 A.2d 465, 476-78 (1978) (allowing a
cause of action under the New Jersey Constitution for sex discrimination); Terranova v. New
York, 111 Misc. 2d 1089, 1095-96, 445 N.Y.S.2d 965, 969-70 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1982) (finding an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the New York Constitution and granting dam-
ages as a remedy); Hunter v. Port Auth., 277 Pa. Super. 4, 14, 419 A.2d 631, 636 (1980)
(allowing a cause of action under the Pennsylvania Constitution when one's right to pursue
employment is obstructed). Arguably, California is the leader in this rebirth of federalism.
Friesen, supra note 22, at 1276. Justice Tobriner indeed held that there is no state action
requirement in finding an unconstitutional discrimination in employment by a public utility.
Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 467-72, 595 P.2d 592, 597-
600, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 19-22 (1979); see Friesen, supra note 22 at 1277 ("The possibility of
imposing constitutional norms on private actors is potentially one of the most far-reaching
changes in constitutional law to be worked by the state civil rights movement.").
Despite this ground swell, some states have refused to recognize a cause of action arising
from their state constitutions. See, e.g., King v. Alaska State Hous. Auth., 633 P.2d 256, 260
(Alaska 1980) (declining to recognize an action for damages under the Alaska Constitution
because of the potential for "endless lawsuits"); Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 381-82, 604
P.2d 1198, 1205 (1979) (maintaining that a claim for damages under the Hawaii Constitution
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Agents.6 3  Bivens sought damages under the Fourth Amendment,"
claiming that federal officers conducted an unreasonable search and
seizure.65 In a trailblazing announcement, the Supreme Court inferred a
cause of action for damages directly under the United States Constitu-
tion.66 The Court did not find the right to a common-law cause of action
under the Constitution unqualified; to the contrary, it identified two situ-
ations in which it would not infer a cause of action: when there are "spe-
cial factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress," 67 and when Congress has provided an equally effective rem-
edy.68 The Court, moreover, left a substantial obstacle to Bivens-type
against the state is prevented by the doctrine of sovereign immunity); Hunter v. City of Eu-
gene, 309 Or. 298, 304, 787 P.2d 881, 884 (1990) (leaving it to the legislature to imply a private
cause of action for damages under the Oregon Constitution). The Alaska Supreme Court re-
cently retreated somewhat from its holding in King, however, by announcing in Alaska Pacific
Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984), its willingness to recognize an action for
damages under the Alaska Constitution, although the court dismissed plaintiffs action because
the defendant was not a state actor. Id. at 275-76. Rationales underlying the refusal to recog-
nize a private cause of action include the belief that the legislature is the proper governmental
branch to establish remedies and set limits on state liability, Hunter, 309 Or. at 303-04, 787
P.2d at 884, or the notion that sovereign immunity bars suit against the state. Figueroa, 61
Haw. at 381-82, 604 P.2d at 1205; see Friesen, supra note 22, at 1280.
63. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
64. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures and
against the issuance of warrants upon less than probable cause).
65. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
66. Id. at 397. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, opined that persons injured
should be able to seek relief notwithstanding the absence (§ 1983 only applies to state and
local, not federal, officers) of a statutory remedy. Id. at 392. For a discussion of the role of
state constitutions in creating private causes of action in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's
later retreat from its holding in Bivens, see William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495-502 (1977); see also William J.
Brennan, Jr., Foreword to Symposium-"The Law of the Land': The North Carolina Constitu-
tion and State Constitutional Law, 70 N.C. L. Rav. 1701, 1701 (1992) [hereinafter Brennan,
Symposium Preface].
In a concurrence to the Bivens majority, Justice Harlan noted that the Court is primarily
responsible for enforcing the Bill of Rights, and thus legislative action is not necessary for the
judiciary to craft the appropriate relief. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring). Com-
pare id. (Harlan, J., concurring) with Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290 ("It is the
state judiciary that has the responsibility to protect the state constitutional rights of the citi-
zens .... ."). Chief Justice Burger dissented, warning that creating a cause of action should be
a congressional function. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 429
(Black, J., dissenting) (contending that if Congress wanted to create a remedy for constitu-
tional violations by federal officers it would have extended § 1983 to federal actors); id. at 430
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the authority to create causes of action belongs to
Congress, not the Court).
67. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
68. Id. at 397. The Court more recently merged these two factors, viewing an alternative
remedial scheme created by Congress as a factor which counsels hesitation. See Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423, 428-29 (1988).
The Court has extended the Bivens analysis to other provisions in the Bill of Rights. E.g.,
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claims by not addressing whether sovereign immunity would act as a bar
to actions against the state or government officials acting in their official
capacities. The only mention of the doctrine appears in Justice Harlan's
concurrence: "However desirable a direct remedy against the Govern-
ment might be as a substitute for individual official liability, the sovereign
still remains immune to suit."69 Nevertheless, Bivens opened the doors of
compensation to many persons whose constitutional rights federal offi-
cials violated.
Beginning in the 1980s, some ten years after its decision in Bivens,
the Supreme Court began to retreat from enthusiastically proclaiming
similar direct causes of action.70 Against the backdrop of this federal
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20-23 (1980) (acknowledging a private cause of action for
violations of the Eighth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979) (the
same for violations of the Fifth Amendment). Lower federal courts further extended Bivens to
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622, 624
(1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979).
69. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). For a criticism of this result, see
Rosen, supra note 24, at 346-48.
70. In Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), for example, the Court refused to permit a
Bivens suit under the First Amendment when an employee was demoted because of his public
statements, id. at 390, even though a damages remedy would be more effective than the ex-
isting statutory relief provided by the Civil Service Commission regulations, and even though
Congress had not precluded the use of a Bivens suit, id. at 378, because alternative remedies
existed under the Civil Service Commission regulations. Id. at 385-86. Similarly, in
Schweiker, the majority did not allow a Social Security beneficiary to bring a Bivens-type action
under the Due Process Clause because of the administrative and judicial procedures which
Congress had established to correct improper denials of disability benefits. Schweiker, 487
U.S. at 429.
The Supreme Court's restrictive treatment of Bivens suits has prompted many state judges
and legal commentators to advocate adjudicating constitutional claims under state constitu-
tions rather than focusing primarily on the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 959-72 (1982); Exum, supra note
5, at 8-9; Friesen, supra note 22, at 1271; Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the
States'Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 383 (1980); Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitu-
tions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RuTGERS L. REV. 707, 717 (1983). But
see Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEx. L. REV. 995, 1007 (1985)
(pointing out potential problems with expanding state constitutional adjudication). For a com-
prehensive overview and analysis of the underlying theories governing this state activism, see
Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1324, 1331-1493 (1982).
Justice Brennan, who in 1977 authored the seminal article calling for increased judicial
activism under state constitutions, is primarily responsible for this revamping of federalism.
Brennan, 90 HARV. L. REV., supra note 66, at 502 ("I suggest to the bar that, although in the
past it might have been safe for counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state
courts, plainly it would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state constitutional
questions"); see Brennan, Symposium Preface, supra note 66, at 1701; William J. Brennan, Jr.,
The Bill of Rights and the States: the Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual
Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 546-53 (1986). Brennan's plea for increased protection of
individual rights under state constitutions resulted largely from the Supreme Court's general
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constitutional ebb, the flow of Corum with respect to state constitutional
causes of action is dramatic.71 In Corum, North Carolina responded to
the clarion call caused by the Supreme Court's change in position,72 and
provided a Bivens-type remedy under its state constitution.73
As with many constitutional decisions, Corum can be interpreted
narrowly or broadly. On the one hand, the implied constitutional cause
of action for damages may be confined to violations of free speech rights.
Indeed, Corum phrased the issue as whether a cause of action exists
under the constitution for violations of the free speech provision.74 The
court's formulation of the holding likewise is structured upon freedom of
speech. 5
Even if Corum is not limited strictly to freedom of speech cases,
attorneys seeking to extend Colrum may encounter obstacles as a result of
ambiguities in the court's decision. By stating that free speech deserves
at least as much protection as the right to own and use property,
76
Corum may be interpreted as having created a hierarchy of protection of
those individual rights enumerated in the constitution.77 Under this type
of analysis, future courts could refuse to extend Corum to those provi-
sions in the Declaration of Rights deemed less significant than free
speech or property rights. The supreme court, moreover, may have lim-
ited Corum-type actions to intentional violations, or at least to state ac-
tors with a mens rea greater than negligence. Qualified immunity, still an
available defense to a Corum-based cause of action,78 rests on a defend-
ant's good faith; a plaintiff's showing of bad faith would require evidence
retreat from the types of protections afforded by Bivens-type actions. See Brennan, 90 HARV.
L. REv., supra note 66, at 495.
71. See Louis D. Bilionis, On the Significance of Constitutional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. REv.
1803, 1814-15 (1992).
72. See supra note 70.
73. See supra notes 34-39, 45-47 and accompanying text.
74. Corum, 330 N.C. at 781, 413 S.E.2d at 289.
75. Id. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 292.
76. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
77. See Corum, 330 N.C. at 784, 413 S.E.2d at 291 ("Various rights that are protected by
our Declaration of Rights may require greater or lesser relief to rectify the violation of such
rights, depending upon the right violated and the facts of the particular case.") (emphasis
added). It should be noted, however, that this statement appeared in the court's discussion of
the nature of the remedy and not in the creation of the cause of action. See id. at 784, 413
S.E.2d at 290-91.
78. Although it abolished sovereign immunity, the court explained that defendants still
are "entitled to all defenses that may arise upon the facts and law of the case." Id. at 786, 413
S.E.2d at 292. The applicable defense in Corum for defendant Durham is qualified immunity,
which is based on the good faith of the defendant. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying
text.
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of culpable behavior more egregious than simple negligence.7 9
The court's characterization of the free speech provision also sug-
gests a narrow approach. First, the court described freedom of speech as
"a direct personal guarantee," which suggests that only personal rights,
as opposed to collective rights, should receive Corum protection. 80 Sec-
ond, the court's emphasis on the self-executing nature of the free speech
and property provisions8l raises the question whether the supreme court
will view all provisions in the Declaration of Rights as self-executing for
purposes of granting Corum protection. Finally, the existence of suffi-
cient82 statutory remedies, as mentioned in both Corum"3 and Bivens,"4
may preclude an implied cause of action under some other constitutional
provisions."' Any judicial intrusion upon the legislature would be espe-
cially acute in North Carolina, because the Declaration of Rights con-
tains a provision guaranteeing the separation of powers.8 6
Several factors, on the other hand, suggest that Corum indeed may
have broad implications for individuals seeking a private right of action
for violations of their state constitutional rights. Perhaps most impor-
tant, the Corum court stressed that "[t]he very purpose of the Declara-
tion of Rights is to ensure that the violation of these rights is never
permitted."' Similarly, the court proclaimed that everyone "whose
state constitutional rights have been abridged" has a cause of action
under the constitution.88 Equally expansive is the supreme court's trium-
phant declaration that the common law will provide a remedy for "every
79. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
80. Corum, 330 N.C. at 781, 413 S.E.2d at 289 ("The words 'shall never be restrained' are
a direct personal guarantee.... ." (quoting N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14)). As an example of this
possible distinction, compare N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 ("Freedom of speech and of the press
... shall never be restrained.. .. "), a personal right, with N.C. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("The
people have a right to assemble together .... ) (emphasis added), which could be interpreted
as a collective right.
81. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
82. North Carolina provides an administrative cause of action for an employee who
claims he had been discharged or demoted without just cause. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35
(1991). The supreme court in Corum evidently believed that this remedy was not sufficient in
redressing violations of Corum's free speech rights.
83. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
85. For example, North Carolina statutes allow a claim against a state agency for money
due on a construction contract, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-135.3 (1991), and permit an individual
to seek compensation for the taking of land against the Department of Transportation. Id.
§ 136-111. Moreover, an administrative cause of action is available for an employee who
claims she was denied employment benefits in violation of her equal protection rights.
86. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
87. Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289 (emphasis added).
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wrong," 9 and the court's "liberal interpretation" of those constitutional
provisions which guarantee individual rights.90 The court's language in
defining the scope of the remedy-that "[vlarious rights that are pro-
tected by our Declaration of Rights may require greater or lesser relief to
rectify the violation of such rights, depending upon the right vio-
lated," 91-likewise suggests that Corum will provide a font of protection
generally to rights in the state constitution. Finally, the court permitted
the implied cause of action to supplement some remedies already avail-
able to plaintiffs, rather than limiting it to situations in which no possible
alternative remedy existed.92
If attorneys seize this broad interpretation and bring Corum-type
actions in state courts, the decision's primary effect, because of the inter-
play between the state and federal constitutions, will expand the overall
protection of individual liberties afforded citizens of North Carolina.
North Carolina's Declaration of Rights includes many of the provisions
which are found in the Federal Bill of Rights. 93 The North Carolina
Supreme Court, however, is not bound by the United States Supreme
Court's construction of an analogous federal provision when construing
the state constitution: the federal Constitution provides a minimum level
of protection to individuals, below which the states may not fall, but be-
yond which state constitutions are free to go.94 For example, the state
constitution's due process and equal protection provisions95 could sweep
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 784, 413 S.E.2d at 291 (emphasis added).
92. Because Corum could not seek monetary damages against Durham in his official ca-
pacity under § 1983, he was limited to injunctive relief. Id. at 771, 413 S.E.2d 282-83; accord
will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). Corum may, however,
seek monetary damages under § 1983 against Durham in his individual capacity. Corum, 330
N.C. at 798, 413 S.E.2d at 293-94. Thus, the supreme court created a constitutional cause of
action as intersticial relief which is not necessarily precluded where there are alternative reme-
dies. Contra Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1983) (denying aBivens-type action because
of a congressionally created alternative remedy); see discussion supra note 70.
93. E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 12 (right to assemble); id. § 13 (right to worship); id. § 14
(free speech and press); id. § 19 (equal protection provision and the law of the land provision,
which is analogous to a due process provision,); id. § 20 (prohibition against general warrants,
which is analogous to a prohibition of unreasonable search and seizures); id. § 23 (freedom
from self-incrimination); id. § 24 (right to jury trial); id. § 27 (protection against cruel and
unusual punishments); id. § 30 (right of militia to bear arms).
94. Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290; Exum, supra note 5, at 8.
95. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. Rather than "due process," the state constitution uses the
term "law of the land." Id. The law of the land provision, nonetheless, is synonymous with
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process provision. State v. Smith, 90 N.C. App. 161, 163,
368 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1988), afid, 323 N.C. 703, 374 S.E.2d 866, cerL denied, 490 U.S. 1100
(1989). Like its federal counterpart, it pertains to both procedural and substantive law. In re
Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 97-98, 221 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1976). Any decision by the Supreme Court
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into the Declaration of Rights an unlimited host of court-construed indi-
vidual rights which may fall under Corum's umbrella of protection.96
North Carolina's Declaration of Rights, moreover, enumerates
rights not included in the Federal Bill of Rights.97 Potentially, the most
significant of these rights in terms of Corum's impact is the right to edu-
cation. 8 A plaintiff who could prove a denial of equal access, whether it
be a classification based on race or on disparity in wealth, 99 may be lim-
which construes the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause is, however, not binding on
the state supreme court's interpretation of the law of the land clause. Bulova Watch Co. v.
Brand Distrib. of N. Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 474, 206 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1974).
The North Carolina Supreme Court also uses the federal analysis for equal protection
purposes. When a legislative act infringes upon a fundamental right or distinguishes between
people of a suspect class, the supreme court engages in strict scrutiny. Abbott v. Town of
Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 75, 277 S.E.2d 820, 824-25, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 710, 283
S.E.2d 136 (1981).
Both of these provisions enable the court to read rights into the state constitution, even in
situations in which the Supreme Court has refused to recognize the same rights under the
Federal Constitution. In Texas, for example, the court of appeals extended the right of privacy
to homosexual conduct, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's refusal to do so under the fed-
eral Constitution in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). State v. Morales, No. 3-91-195-
CV, 1992 WL 44590, at * 3-5 (Tx. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 1992).
96. These unenumerated rights include the right to pursue an occupation, Treants En-
ters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 354, 350 S.E.2d 365, 371 (1986) (labelling the
right to earn a living as "fundamental" for purposes of constitional adjudication), afd, 320
N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987); of equal access to participation in the public school system,
Sneed v. Greensboro City Board of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 618, 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (1980)
(declaring that equal access is a fundamental right protected by due process); of freedom of
contract, Louchheim, Eng. & People, Inc. v. Carson, 35 N.C. App. 299, 306, 241 S.E.2d 401,
405 (1978) (explaining that freedom of contract is a liberty and a property right that can be
restricted only by a valid exercise of police power); and freedom to travel. State v. Dobbins,
277 N.C. 484, 499, 178 S.E.2d 499, 457-58 (1971). Athough the supreme court could refuse to
extend Corum beyond the express constitutional provisions to these unenumerated rights, any
distinction would be tenuous since these rights are actually incorporated into the law of the
land and equal protection provision, and because it only takes the court's articulation of a right
to make it self-executing.
97. These rights, for example, include the protection of the habeas corpus privilege, N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 21, guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases, N.C. CONST. art I, § 25, and free-
dom from discriminatory exclusion from jury service, N.C. CONST. art. I, § 26.
98. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 15 ("The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it
is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right."). The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit has construed this provision to "embody [a] mandate[] for the
establishment of free public schools in North Carolina, the untrammeled privilege of education
for all students, and 'the duty of the State to maintain and guard that right,' while guarantee-
ing equal opportunities to all students." Webster v. Perry, 512 F.2d 612, 615 (4th Cir. 1975)
(quoting N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 15).
99. The United States Supreme Court has refused to bestow constitutional protection on
education, because the Court does not view education as a fundamental right deserving of
strict scrutiny. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 25, 37 (1973). Fur-
thermore, the Court will not subject any legislation which has a disparaging impact upon
districts with a low tax base to strict scrutiny, because it does not believe that the impoverished
are a suspect class. Id. The problem in North Carolina, however, is not in granting constitu-
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ited no longer to injunctive relief if the court chooses to grant damages
under a Corum-type action.
The state judiciary, when interpreting potential Corun claims, of
course must heed Corum's admonishment to defer to established reme-
dies so as not to infringe upon the legislative branch. 1°" Within the con-
fines of these restraints, however, North Carolina courts still can use
Corum effectively to fill the gaps in protection for individual rights. But
a critical prerequisite to an extended and meaningful use of Corum is the
initiation of Corum-type actions by state attorneys. Corum is but a call
to arms; only when North Carolina's lawyers reacquaint themselves with
the "old document"10' will a new era of constitutional jurisprudence
fully emerge.
JOHN D. BOUTWELL
tional protection to education but determining what interferes with a person's equal access to
education. The court of appeals, refusing to acknowledge a denial of equal access, recently
dismissed a Rodriquez-type allegation that the system of financing public schools discriminated
against those counties which had a low tax base from which to draw funds. Britt v. North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 290, 357 S.E.2d 432, 436-37, appeal dismissed
and disc rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).
100. Corum, 330 N.C. at 784, 413 S.E.2d at 291; see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying
text.
101. See Exum, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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